









Abstract: The prevailing techno-anxiety of the information age, associated with the use of machines for the purposes of coercion and surveillance of humans, as well as with the loss of individual autonomy and control over one’s body and life, resurfaces as a central issue in the debate about the fate of citizenship. The political aspect of the future of humans as techno-centaurs is traced in several discourses focusing on military, surveillance and experimenter cyborgs, emerging in artistic events and science fiction movies.






The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical transformation.
Donna Haraway​[1]​ 
The range of these intimate human-machine relationships is mind-boggling. It's not just Robocop, it is our grandmother with a pacemaker. 
Chris Gray, Steven Mentor, Jennifer Figueroa-Sarriera ​[2]​
This article starts with the basic premise that we are all now cyborgs, despite the general unease with which this notion is regarded. The changing techno-cultural environment requires a more radical acceptance of the mutability and hybridity of the human and the organic-inorganic fusion that comes to define our “posthuman” subjectivities and physical beings. The cyborg is a liminal figure in several ways: it symbolizes the merging of human and machine, while at the same time acting as a political figuration that is paradoxically invented by, but is resistant to the evolving techno-deterministic order. 
Popular culture discourses, especially science-fiction movies, heighten our awareness of our association with technology and the emerging transformations of our bodies, our selves. Likewise, academic discussions, artistic demonstrations and bodily experimentations highlight the possible outcome in our political and cultural life of these mergings. In order to comprehend the new stage of our “posthuman” evolution, I will be referring to several types of discourses that center on the representation of the cyborgs. These will encompass non-fiction writings of critics, artists and experimenters in digital culture, as well as the changing representations of the cyborg in several movies from the 1980s to the early 2000s.
Admittedly, outside of the circles of techno-enthusiasts there is a strong current of denial of this process of actual merging of human and machine. The widely held view is to reject that humans are evolving into techno-centaurs, so that technological entities are still experienced as the Other. I share Haraway’s argument, which resurfaces in many of her writings, that technological otherness exists within the humans, whether we would admit it or not. Baudrillard also confirms that science fiction is “no longer an elsewhere, it is an everywhere.” (Baudrillard 1991: 13) 
For Haraway the cyborg is a kind of historically defined perspective on the body, and a constructionist one, in the same way in which the body has been constructed previously by scientific (biological) discourses and social (including biomedical) practices.
In her essay The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Determinations of Self in Immune System Discourse (1999) Haraway suggests the three contradictory views through which the cyborg is culturally interpreted. Firstly, from a techno-romantic perspective the cyborg symbolizes the attainable cybernetic vision of mythic freedom. The fusion with the machine offers a channel for transcending reality. The cyborg is thus an ascending angel that leads a life of escapism and is completely detached from ideological, social and political life.
The romantic visions of cyberspace and its citizens, however, sometimes acquire pseudo-political dimensions.​[3]​  What is often implied is the emergence of an anarchic utopia of absolute freedom and equality of the thoughts and identities of the cyborgs that are envisaged as bodiless. So while claiming to be a continuation of the democratic dreams of the Founding Fathers, and aspiring at the same time to be apolitical by denying consensual order altogether, such declarations are in essence oppositional to dominant forms of control and coercion - such as copyright, access to web sites and economic transactions on the Net - that are spreading now over the new “territory” of cyberspace.
Secondly, the blending of machine and body is usually presented, visualized and interpreted as monstrous, dangerous, aggressive and fearsome, as it embodies techno-paranoid anxiety, emotions that have accompanied the advent of each innovation in human history, be it mechanical, electrical or digital. In Frankensteinian terms the creation is engaged in a lethal battle with its creator and often ends up overpowering or destroying its “father.” 
Thirdly, and most significantly for the purposes of this article, the cyborg for Haraway is a political and social figuration, preeminently a figure of opposition and resistance to power. “The ubiquity and invisibility of cyborgs is precisely why these sunshine-belt machines are so deadly. They are as hard to see politically as materially. They are about consciousness – or its simulation. They are floating signifiers…” (Haraway 2004: 12)
It is my view that the cyborg, though a product of our imagination, is not currently part only of our futuristic visions, but of our digital, cultural and political reality. In Real Life this merging of human and machine can be witnessed in different areas, though the establishment of conceptual limits and boundaries becomes a complex process. The situation lands up on more difficult terrain when, rather than repairing the ineffective parts of a human body, technology is employed to enhance normal functioning. Many examples of this already exist, particularly in the military domain.
A helpful reminder is the origin of the word cyborg. It was used for the first time at a 1960 NASA conference on the modifications that humans had to undergo in order to live in outer space. Manfred Clynes, a world class pianist and computer specialist, combined the words “cybernetic” and “organism” to come up with “cyborg” in his paper, coauthored with the famous psychiatrist and expert on psychotropic drugs, Nathan Kline.​[4]​ The two scientists argued that implants and drugs could make possible human existence in space. They have eventually admitted that genetic modification would also be part of such a radical project; however, this would take place in the final stage of the cyborgization of the human.
For Chris Gray, a self-professed “cyborgologist”, who became internationally known as the editor of the seminal Cyborg Handbook, and author of the recent Cyborg Citizen, the cyborg is any “self-regulating organism that combines the natural and artificial together in one system.” (2001a: 2)
In an interview Gray gives further clarification: 
My definition of a cyborg is that it is any sort of coherent system that has both components that are artificial and natural, living and dead, evolved and invented. A cyborg does not have to be conscious. For example, people who are legally dead but kept alive through machines are cyborgs, a biocomputer that stores information in some sort of biological construction is a cyborg, a genetically engineered cell, a mouse that has an automatic pump attached to it is a cyborg, the Golem is a cyborg. (2001b: no page, my emphasis)
	
The cyborg in this and many similar definitions is interpreted very broadly. I suggest a narrowing of the term further and a tentative classification depending on the intensity of symbiosis between the organic and inorganic. Precision is required in demarcating the fine line between human and cyborg, especially when determining which technology, while seemingly indispensable such as cars, phones and planes, serves actually as an extension of our physical capacities and senses in the McLuhanian meaning, and does not substitute them entirely, as could be the case with prostheses and implants of various kinds. 
A division that I find useful in this discussion is suggested by B. Brasher, who notes two basic stages in the merging of human and machine. In the first case, we become borgs – a less privileged state. “[B]ecoming borged can entail one’s humanity being annexed by machines.” (Brasher 1996: 817) Flying in an airplane, driving a car, talking on the phone, using a word processor are clearly instances when we overcome our human, mostly physical limitations. However, on a higher level we attain a more privileged state through “the expansion of the human beyond the pre-cyborgian limits.” (Brasher 1996: 817) In this enhanced entity the potential for the future lies – both in the apocalyptic and rapturous scenarios.
The narrowing of the definition of the cyborg can be sustained by a further classification based on the criterion of purpose or application. In one group fall cyborgs that have become such so as to compensate for a certain physical deficiency or handicap.​[5]​ These are predominantly “medical” cyborgs. Real Life abounds with humans turned cyborgs for medical reasons. Consider the example of the American Michael Chorost, who was born in 1964 with severe loss of hearing due to rubella. His hearing was partially restored with a cochlear implant and he “became” a cyborg on October, 1 2001, when his new ear was booted up. He subsequently wrote a memoir of the experience, entitled Rebuilt: How Becoming Part Computer Made Me More Human (2005). He describes in his book how his body became bewilderingly mechanical, as kitchen magnets would stick to his head and he could plug directly in a CD player. He has his hearing routinely upgraded with new software.​[6]​ 
The second group of cyborgs consists of humans that have incorporated machinic parts to enhance their bodily potential. These I call experimenter cyborgs. Physical handicaps have not forced the experimenters to accept inorganic elements within their organism. They have chosen to do so for the purposes of scientific experiment or in the form of artistic presentations, but mainly to illustrate the ethical and/or political implications of this act. In what follows I will be giving examples predominantly of the second type of cyborgs, alongside with a commentary on the status of the cyborg’s political rights and responsibilities, i.e. on the cyborg as a citizen.
I use the figure of the cyborg to examine the network relations of science, technology, culture and politics. How are our rights and responsibilities reformulated in the moral-political terrain we inhabit together with the machines that we create? The cyborg as a metaphor and a Real Life entity raises ethical and political questions of oppression and emancipation – issues that are as much metaphysical as political.
In most science-fiction movies the human and the machine operate as contestants. There are two possible scenarios of this complex relation.​[7]​ One possibility is that the human becomes enslaved and eventually destroyed by its creation. The other is that the cyborg, as a human acquiring machinic qualities, or an anthropomorphized robot is oppressed and enslaved by the humans. This leads to various forms of resistance on both sides. Often the two struggles are entwined, whereby one instigates the other, leading to the rebellion of the anthropomorphized machine (robot) or cyborg. Harmony can be restored only when the machine is crushed or returned to its subservient position. Significantly, the word "robot", a creation of the 20th century, comes from the Czech word "robota," meaning forced labor. The term was first used in a 1920s play by Karel Capek called R.U.R. (Rossum's Universal Robots). The play dealt with robots created to free humans from the burden of labor, but who eventually turn on and try to destroy their human creators because of their desire for freedom. 
Technology in the movies of the 1980s and 1990s is represented in a similar way as malfunctioning, aggressive, dangerous, and belligerent to the human. In cyborg movies such as the Terminator Series, Total Recall and Robocop​[8]​ the cyborg’s identity can be defined as possessing a paranoid rationality coupled with an aura of omnipotence and self-control, and a deadly aggression towards the physical limitations of humans. Since the figuration of the cyborg serves to represent a hysterical response to the impact of technological development on humanity, in these movies there is a convergence of the horror and the science fiction elements. Rampant technology usually leads to visions of nightmarish reality. We are presented with an apocalyptical view of the future born out of extreme techno-determinism. In the new information order, humans are reduced (physically and mentally) to data bits stored on various devices. The fear of the rebelling robot, as already mentioned, is actually a reflection of the paranoia against the power of technology and the ethical and political implications of scientific discoveries. 
The merging of the human with technology, while now a social fact gathering more impetus every day, is part of dystopic visions of the distant and not so distant future, as well as a resistance to information domination. This techno-anxiety, associated with the misuse of machines for the purposes of coercion, domination and surveillance of humans, resurfaces as the central issue in the debate about the fate of citizenship. In Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age (2001) Chris Hables Gray considers the "politics of the cyborg phenomena," particularly as it relates to the notion of citizenship. In Part I of the book, entitled “Postmodern politics” Gray considers the impact of technology on the political process. He argues that there is a need for “active citizens and new political technologies to protect our rights from the relentless changes that cyborgian technoscience is producing.” (2001a: 9) The result is a new "cyborg body politic" that prompts reconsideration of democratic ideals and practices.
When envisioning the future of the cyborg citizen Gray is motivated by his anxiety about the imposition of technology on human rights, and especially by the appropriation of technological innovations by the military-industrial complex in an escalating spiral of power and control over individual bodies and lives. The extent of control over humans by employing digital technologies is most noticeable in two figurations: the military and the surveillance cyborgs. In the chapter “Cyborg Warriors” Gray highlights the relationship between the military and machines. Postmodern warfare is heavily influenced by techno-science and is dependent on cyborgs. Gray cautions that we are moving towards a militarized politics through the imposition of a continual state of crisis. He describes how the U.S. military continuously produces stronger and more efficient soldiers through the use of mechanical and digital implements. 
As techno-science continues to make more dangerous weapons of mass destruction, there is a chance for extending democracy, but there is just as real a chance that cyborgs may become the ultimate instrument of oppression and control, especially in the form of the military cyborg. Military cyborgs are soldiers, weapons, Terminators, cops, i.e. they serve people to oppress people. With military cyborgs​[9]​ killing is done at a distance, through technological mediation, without the shock of direct confrontation, so that the victims become “invisible” and allow the soldier to achieve moral dissociation from them.
A recent curious example of a military cyborg is an announcement posted on government Web sites by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) stating it is seeking "innovative proposals to develop technology to create insect cyborgs," by implanting tiny devices into insect bodies. The goal is to create technology that can achieve "the delivery of an insect within five meters of a specific target ... using electronic remote control, and/or global positioning system. ... In conjunction with delivery, the insect must remain stationary either indefinitely or until otherwise instructed [and] must also be able to transmit data from [Department of Defense] relevant sensors ... [including] gas sensors, microphones, video, etc."​[10]​ 
Closely related to the military cyborgs and part of the apparatus of governmental and police control are the surveillance cyborgs. Scientists such as Kevin Warwick and Steve Mann and artists such as Eduardo Kac, have readily transformed themselves into experimenter cyborgs, so as to examine in phenomenological terms the ethical and political implications of the human-machine merging. Their findings are relevant to the present discussion, especially since they focus on issues of citizen control. In many ways the following examples are reminiscent of the panoptic principle described by Foucault. However, nowadays surveillance is no longer hierarchical and centralized but distributed, creating a complex network of power relations. Without indicating spaces for interment as in the 19th century, the 21st has indeed become a society of “enclosure” striving for total control, where everybody is simultaneously a subject of the monitoring gaze and an origin of one. The surveillance system becomes a universal one, as everybody is allowed various peeping holes in the life of others; everybody partakes of the panoptic gaze.
In August 1998 K. Warwick, a cybernetics professor at the University of Reading, England, and himself a cyborg, had a silicon chip transponder inserted into his forearm.
The chip allowed a computer to monitor Warwick’s movements throughout the university’s department of cybernetics, and to perform simple actions instead of him, such as opening doors and turning on lights. Significantly, he states that he did not feel the chip as an alien particle, but quickly came to regard it as part of his body. Through the chip he was at all times connected and monitored by the computer in a “Big-Brother” manner. Warwick testifies he developed a strong emotional attachment to the machine: “If I had to draw one conclusion from my experience it would be that when linked with technology inside my body, it is no longer a separate piece of technology. Mentally I regard such technology as just as much part of me as my arms and legs. If my brain was linked with a computer it is difficult to imagine where I would feel my body ended.” (Warwick 2003: no page) 
His purpose was to investigate the possible dramatic influence of increased technological power. An issue that particularly concerns him is the potential for cyborgs to act against, rather than for, the interests of humanity. A subsequent experiment in 2002 including implants is described by Warwick in the following way: 
Signals from my nervous system were transmitted across the internet from Columbia University, New York, to Reading University, UK, to move around a robot hand. The robot hand was directly controlled by my neural signals generated on another continent. Effectively my nervous system did not stop at my body’s limits but rather where the internet link concluded. (Warwick 2003, no page)

The 2002 experiment provided him with an extra ultrasonic sense that can be used in an important and compensatory way by people whose vision is impaired. The purpose of this voluntary act of cyborgization by the scientist was to examine the possible moral implications when the nature of an individual is changed by the linking of the human’s and machine’s mental functioning. In this connection Warwick highlights a number of positive distinctive features of the performance of machine intelligence with which he proves his point that the machine has surpassed humans in many areas of intelligence. Following this argument, he charts out the two options that humans have: to tap directly to machines and thus enhance human intelligence by accepting radical forms of cyborgization; or to withhold from such extreme forms of symbiosis with machines. However, the second alternative would eventually, as Warwick predicts, lead to a separate machine intelligent culture that could threaten and oppose humanity. The scenario expanded on recently in The Matrix Trilogy​[11]​ is a very real scenario for Warwick. For him in the impending fight between human and machine power would be gained by the machine. Warwick concludes: “The leading question realistically is therefore is it morally acceptable for cyborgs to give up their individuality and become mere nodes on an intelligent machine network. This is of course as much of a question for cyborgs as it is for humans.” (Warwick 2003, no page)
Similar apprehension of the loss of individual autonomy and control over one’s body and life are demonstrated by the original artist Eduardo Kac.​[12]​ He is not a political activist, but his work sends out a warning about the evolving digital methods of escalating surveillance and control over individuals. On November 11, 1997, at the cultural center Casa das Rosas in São Paulo, Brazil Kac presented his work entitled "Time Capsule.” He implanted in his ankle an identification microchip with nine digits and registered himself via the Internet with a databank that helps to keep track of animals in the United States. He registered both as an animal and an owner (of himself). The space of the event was set up as a hospital room, but there were computers as well that scanned the artist's body, and transmitted it worldwide as a web cast. There were also the seven only surviving original photographs of the artist's grandmother's family, who were entirely annihilated in Poland during World War II.
In this artistic event the microchip implant in the ankle acquires symbolic meaning, because it is the part of the body - of the slave brought to the New World; of the prisoner during wars; of all adversaries, considered as the Other - that has traditionally been chained or branded. Another possible reading refers to the destabilization of identity and the role of memory in the evolving techno-subjectivity. The act is reminiscent of the movie Blade Runner​[13]​ where the main features distinguishing humans from replicants (robots), alongside self-consciousness and emotion, are memories. In the movie the replicants are fascinated with collecting photographs, which supply them with a simulated past that is a prerequisite for being a human. In a similar way Kac raises the question of whether in the digital age we will lose the sense of past, history, identity, and how will we come to define an essential humanness. 
However, one can also read Kac's work from another perspective - as a prediction of the biological mutation that might eventually take place. Kac's event suggests that in the future the robot, so often presented in science fiction as an invader usurping humans, might be inside us and might, given time, become ourselves. Again the common points with Blade Runner resurface. In the movie Deckard is recruited as a blade runner in 2017 to “retire” several replicants that have mutinied. His greatest problem is detecting them, so that: “[e]verything in the course of Deckard’s ‘detection’ of the replicants leads him – and his audience – to a self-detection of a different and disturbing sort: namely, the recognition of the undecidable nature of the opposition between human and its technological double.” (Pyle 2000: 130) 
Similar questions of digital surveillance and control are raised by the American Steve Mann, considered by some as the founder of the field of wearable computing. In his more than 200 publications Mann describes his merging with computer devices, some of which he has worn for over 20 years now​[14]​. As Mann is a strong advocate of privacy rights, he has tried to resist the imposition of technology on the individual through the method of sousveillance – a term he coined for “inverse surveillance.” Though his experiments and live performances do not include the implantation of technological components in his body, but its enhancement by various devices, he still raises similar issues concerning the control and autonomy of the subject as Warwick and Kac.
Mann proposes the concept of “Existential Technology”​[15]​ as “the technology of self-determination and mastery over our own destiny.” (Mann 2004: no page) He suggests several examples of “in(ter)ventions”, i.e. inventions of his that could intervene with the monitoring technologies and surveillance practices of organizations that have made the individual vulnerable.
In a series of performances from the mid-1980s onwards Mann used various apparatuses, some of which he did not even operate intentionally, to react to surveillance in supermarkets and airports with counter-surveillance. An example of his existential technology is the “wearcam” - wearing a photographic apparatus creating an “incidentalist” intervention. In his popular Wearable Wireless Webcam live performance on the Web from 1994 to 1996, his body could be remotely operated by others to take pictures. In such a way his body, complemented by wearable technology, was activated by the willpower of other humans, who could apply it for counter-surveillance purposes. His experiments have highlighted the status of the contemporary citizen, whose body is “disciplined” in Michel Foucault’s terms through the mediation of technology. The military and surveillance cyborgs can be interpreted as representing what Foucault calls “the political economy of the body,” though not in such direct and apparent ways as training, marking, forcing or otherwise punishing the body. (Foucault 1984: 212) 
Also admitting the reality of the threats of the invasion of technology in our private spaces, bodies and everyday lives, (which I have illustrated with several examples of experimenter cyborgs), Gray has offered two remedies to right the technological wrongs done to humans. As the new citizen evolves and becomes part human and part machine, it becomes necessary for the political system to take into account the machinic part of the cyborg. It also needs to reformulate the rules, so as to guarantee the rights and responsibilities of the cyborg citizen. The first solution suggested by Gray is a political document. Our cyborg bodies need protection and representation that Gray offers in the form of a “Cyborg Bill of Rights.”​[16]​ It includes amendments such as the freedom of travel, the right to death, and the right to political equality based on your arguments in the public sphere, rather than your wealth and social position. While this particular “Bill of Rights” is designed to be amended into the U.S. Constitution, the idea is relevant to all contemporary democracies.
His second suggestion for countering governmental impositions on the citizen, that have become possible through the use of technological innovations, is a scientific test. Gray expresses the view that citizenship is not an abstract concept, and does not have universal value. It is based on assumptions about the consent of the governed, the relationship between responsibility and rights, and the autonomy of individuals. Tests for citizenship have ranged from gender and class, literacy, to the current situation where birthright guarantees eventual citizenship, and finally to Gray’s suggestion – the Turing test. 
Gray proposes a cyborg Turing Test​[17]​ that would allow other citizens to decide if a cyborg should be granted the rights of citizenship. In the Turing test potential citizens would be required to persuade a group of twelve peers that they can “communicate” well enough to be included in the conversation of politics. If they pass the test, the cyborg would be granted the status of citizenship. I consider Gray’s suggestion to be basically inapplicable for it stresses on the significance of language and discursive skills in the act of recognizing the cyborg as a citizen of equal status. In my view this is a rather limited approach that presupposes subjectivity in the referees and populist machinations on the part of the refereed that could, with their enhanced intelligence, master the discourse of the “genuine” citizen. 
This issue is related to the problematic nature of hybrid identity and the fuzzy boundary between human and machine. As I see it, there are two divergent views on what distinguishes humans from machines, and what could be used as a criterion for the “humanization” of a technical entity. From the point of view of science the difference between the human and the machine is one of intelligence. This could explain why Gray in his definition of the cyborg, excludes the element of consciousness. If a machine is not self-aware, and can not learn from experience, it is deficient in intelligence and hence is not human. A machine would be accepted as equal to a human only and if only it develops consciousness and henceforth learns the responsibilities and rights of enlightened citizenship.
However, according to popular view, the robot or the cyborg is deficient because it lacks an emotional life. Once it becomes self-aware and acquires the possibility to evolve into an intelligent form independent of its creator, it becomes a threat to the human, the popular view goes, because of its inability to feel compassion and empathy, i.e. to be humane.
Two movies could illustrate this point: I, Robot (2004)​[18]​ and The Bicentennial man (1999)​[19]​. Significantly both movies are based on short stories by the master of the genre Isaac Asimov, and both incorporate the famous Asimov’s Three Laws or Robotics​[20]​ that have to be programmed into every robot to safeguard it from harming humans in any way and to ensure its subservient position. 
The common point in both movies is that the robot as a non-human is created to serve humans and is designated to the status of the slave. As in most cyborg movies there is also an allegory of the human’s potential enslavement to and possible liberation from technology. In I, Robot the robot becomes dangerous, because it develops its own intelligence; it is no longer simply a machine, but “learns to learn” and becomes self-aware, i.e. acquires an essential humanity from a scientific point of view. At this point, however, it rebels against its subservient social, economical and political position. Requiring more freedom and rights, it becomes an enemy to the humans. This struggle, as is the tradition in the genre of the action movie, is rarely voiced, but is depicted as physical violence directed towards the humans. Still, the political implications behind the revolt of the cyborgs are clear: they are mistreated and repressed. 
The cyborg is envisaged as the Other – the lethal, deadly, intelligent machine that is like a human, but is also deficient in a major way, for it lacks sensitivity of any kind. However, as the movie shows, the cyborg can also be a human – the detective, played by Will Smith. He has a prosthesis because of a terrible accident and without it he would not be such an efficient warrior in the struggle against the conscious machines. Once again the movie suggests that the line of division between human and machine is not blunt but blurry. The movie gives a rather simplistic answer to this serious issue of the contention and merging of the human and the machine: humanity and technology are restored to their proper balance only when the robot is crushed.
The Bicentennial Man suggests another possible, less deadly compromise. The movie is based on the novella by Isaac Asimov.​[21]​ The story was originally written for the 1976 American bicentennial. Asimov was one of several authors commissioned to write a story revolving around the phrase "the bicentennial man", which the writers were to interpret in whatever way they chose. The plan was for the stories to be published as an anthology, but this project was not realized. 
This movie offers a positive outcome, for the robot undergoes a reverse process of humanization. The anthropoid, Andrew, out of his own will embarks on the journey of transformation from robot to cyborg to human, by incorporating organic elements in his body. Essentially what makes him human is firstly the ability to feel, secondly to understand language (such as humor and irony) and finally, to accept mortality. While it seems to suggest a possibility for the peaceful co-existence of human and machine, the movie actually offers a utopian romantic vision of technology being anthropomorphized and made human, by denying its essential technological features. Only when Andrew allows his positronic brain to “decay”, thereby willfully abandoning his immortality, is he declared a human being.
 Bicentennial Man's most intriguing and most undeveloped aspect involves the portrayal of a society of humans, who resists full acceptance of the humanized robot. “Human” is a legal term in the context of the movie, in the hands of the courts to decide.
Andrew fulfills his quest of being human on the two-hundredth anniversary of his creation, which gives one explanation of the title. Another is associated with the special occasion for which the script was written and serves further as an allegorical commentary on the central democratic values of American society, and the agreement of what it means to be human and recognized as a citizen. 
Just as with the Turing test for granting citizenship to cyborgs suggested by Gray, so in The Bicentennial Man the anthropoid is granted the right to be human by an institutionalized system - the legal system. This is one step towards the recognition that the newly emerging hybrid forms of human and machine require political recognition, while at the same time acknowledging that we still believe there is an essentialist humanness, i.e. that the state of being human can be posited in definitive terms and that we are willing to put up a fight to protect this.
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